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The aim of this paper is to show how sociocybernetics can usefully combine biological, psychological and 
sociological concepts to provide conceptual clarification and insightful understandings of human consciousness. 
Following a brief discussion and critique of how the term “consciousness” is used in contemporary cognitive 
science, awareness and consciousness are characterised in cybernetic terms as the dynamics of self-organising, 
autopoietic systems and their interactions. Sociocybernetic models of conscious systems are presented and 
discussed. It is argued that in order to characterise human consciousness it is necessary to make a distinction 
between bio-mechanical systemic unities and psychosocial systemic unities. Reflexively, this gives rise to a second-
order cybernetics in which the observer explains herself to herself. Finally, there is a discussion of how 
sociocybernetic understandings of consciousness can give guidance for how to create and sustain communities in 





“Ev    h  g                     d     p     ”, A  x  d   v   H m   d  (1769 – 1859). Cited in Wulf, 
The Invention of Nature (2015, p. 59). 
 The aim of this paper is to show how sociocybernetics, using abstract concepts from cybernetics, 
can usefully combine biological, psychological and sociological concepts to provide conceptual 
clarification and insightful understandings of human consciousness. The cybernetic concepts that 
are central in my account include feedback, circular causality, self-organisation, adaptation, 
organisational closure, autopoiesis and variety management. I also draw on ideas, models and 
empirical work that I have discussed in a number of previous papers and weave them together to 
construct what I hope is a coherent narrative. 
The motivation for writing this paper is to add to our understanding of the human condition. As a 
 p     , w    v     ‘    g             ’,    wh  h w      d        g  h          m  h     pp        
(our home), we are killing and oppressing each other, population growth is out of control, we have 
pathological belief systems in so-     d ‘    g         h ’ ,           , p          d      m   . 
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The paper is structured as follows. There is a brief discussion and critique of how the term 
‘             ’       d   d      d in contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science (philosophy 
of mind, cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence). As a preface to a cybernetic approach to 
this topic, there is a brief discussion of reflexive cosmogony and process metaphysics. This is 
followed by a cybernetic characterisation of awareness and consciousness. With these 
characterisations, we can then say that conscious systems are objects of study in sociocybernetics.  
Some sociocybernetic models of conscious systems are then presented and discussed. There is then a 
discussion of how these sociocybernetics understandings of consciousness can give ethical guidance 
    h w     h          ,          d         “h    h ”   mm           wh  h g  d w    p  v    . 
Finally, there are some concluding comments. 
2. Use of the term ‘consciousness’ 
In cognitive science (which includes cognitive neuroscience, artificial intelligence and philosophy of 
m  d) “             ”       q             d      k  d    “       ”     d       j    v   xp       . 
Explaining how this essence arises – or may arise –              d                      d        h  ‘h  d 
p     m’.     Th    pp    h m              d        ,     h            g     d              m d  
between the world of experience (mind, subjectivity) and the world of matter (brain and body) and 
also as interactionist, in that a search is made in the latter for that which gives rise to the former. In 
contrast, in cybernetics, and its precursors in the American pragmatist philosophy (for example, in 
William James Principles of Psychology,  first published in 1898), it assumed that for all subjective 
 xp         h         m        (     ,   d )          ,   p    d     h   ph    m, “A  h  gh      h  
h  d      k             h  h  d.”       
I propose that the    m “             ”  h   d       d    p  p   d     h                 W      
McCulloch (1965), Heinz von Foerster (2003), Gordon Pask (1975, 1986) and Richard Jung (2007) to 
         “k  w  g w  h” (L.    -scire), where the knowing can be with another or with oneself.   This 
usage distinguishes consciousness as a primarily human phenomenon from the more general 
ph   m        “ w       ”      v d      v  g      m .  
Pask, in several early papers and in his book (1975) book,  Conversation, Cognition and Learning, 
presents a cybernetic account of awareness. Awareness is characterised cybernetically as the 
dynamics of a self-  g      g,     p       (p   , ‘  g                   d’)      m.    h      m      
    v  ‘          v      ’. Th      k   v         xp    ng, and thus enlarging, their environmental 
niches. They actively adapt to environmental perturbations in an ongoing process of variety 
(uncertainty) generation by exploration and variety (uncertainty) reduction by anticipation. This 
process can be found in all living systems.  According to Pask, it finds its highest expression in 
h m   , wh   xh     “     d         ” (P  k, 1968, p.1).  Th    h         h                 P  k’  w  k 
on adaptive teaching machines, in which the machines aim to optimise the rate of learning in human 
learners by presenting problems of increasing difficulty as learning takes place, in such a way as to 
avoid boredom or overload. 
In summary, an observer may distinguish all living systems as showing awareness.  She may attribute 
con               h    w  h wh m  w                h   d      ‘k  w  g w  h’         v           
interaction. 
3. Reflexive cosmogony and process metaphysics 
“L                     d          ” (G  d   P  k); “Th          d   d      ” (H   z v   F       ); 
“Th  w   d ..              d      d      k  w        .. Wh   v                   p               .” (G   g  
Spencer-Brown).  
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I begin this section with the above quotations to emphasise that we humans are a mystery that is 
part of a mystery. We are faced with undecideable questions such as: How did the world begin 
(cosmogony)? Is there a purpose to it all? What is life? How does the body work? Are there 
transcendentals? What happened before the big bang? As von Foerster emphasises, as human beings 
our ultimate freedom resides in how we choose to answer these undecideable questions. Our 
answers about our world take the form of stories we tell ourselves, cosmogonies. Insofar as these 
stories address questions about who, what and why we are, they are reflexive cosmogonies. Where 
should our stories begin? Answering this question takes us into the realm of metaphysics. Here are 
some examples of metaphysical starting points. 
Pleroma (formless stuff) and Creatura ( the world of distinctions) (Carl Jung, 1916,  also cited by 
Gregory Bateson, 1972); Void (full emptiness) and Not-Void (empty fullness) from Hindu philosophy; 
Indefiniteness and Form (Richard Jung, 2007); the void and the form of distinction  (George Spencer-
Brown, 1969). Essentially, these distinctions are saying the same thing: there is the world of 
undifferentiated, undescribable all; there is the world of distinction and description constructed by 
observers. A    d K  z   k  (1933)            h     m      ‘ h           ’   d  h            ‘ h  m p’    
h     m     ph    m, “Th  m p         h           .”  
From classical times, a distinction has been made between cosmogonies that emphasise what the 
world is made of (its being) as ultimate, unchanging essence or substance and those that emphasise 
 h  p             h  g  ( h  w   d’      m  g)     h               .  T        p   ,            
theories are oriented towards process, how things behave, and look for explanation not in what those 
 h  g      m d            h w  h         g     d. A        ,           d     h  ‘   h           g ’    
w        h  ‘   h        g  ’ h                 m d (   G  g    B        m  g     h   )     h  ‘   h   
              ’  T   nticipate the discussion of explanation in cybernetics, the reader may find it 
h  p              A        ’  d            h       ‘      ’              h v  k  w  dg      h  w   d 
     d    . I       ,  h                  ‘m             ’ (wh      h  g    m d    ), ‘               ’ 
(wh   h d    h pp          g  h   h  g      ), ‘   m        ’ ( h     m     d         h  g), ‘      
     ’ ( h  p  p       wh  h    h  g    p  ). 
E h  d  v   D m    ,    h   (1967)  h     “Th  L g                  M  d”,        a variant on 
A        ’    h m . H    k    h       p     ‘                xp       ’    m  h  ‘  g            ’ 
process philosophy of Andrew North Whitehead and applies it phenomenologically to the 
experience of an observer. For von Demarus, such an occasion of experience has four aspects: 
‘p    g ’      m , ‘ x       ’     p   , ‘ d  ’ ( h     m  d     g   h d     h       v  )   d ‘         ’ 
(the purpose of the observer). 
In similar spirit, Richard Jung in his (2009) book, Experience and Action, develops a cybernetic 
phenomenology in which he distinguishes four explanatory metaphors: two for things that move or 
  h v  (    m v   ): ‘  g    m ’ (wh  h    p  d       m   ), ‘m  h    ’ ( wh  h p     m);   d  w  
     h  g   h    h w p  p    (    v     ): ‘m  d’ (                 ),   d ‘  mp     ’ (  ‘  m      
p  x  ’,              d   ).  
The significance of these schema for cybernetics is that they make clear the richness of phenomena 
that the study of purposive systems must take into account, whether building purpose (anticipation, 
goal seeking, goal maintenance, adaptation) into mechanical systems or explaining and modelling 
purpose in biological, psychological and social systems. 
4. Cybernetic Modelling and Explanation 
Ashby (1956 p. 2) states that cyberneti       h     d     “    p        m  h    ”. A h        ‘m  h   ’ 
           m     ‘     m’ wh           m     h   wh  h p       . I  A h  ’  v  w  h           
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principle, concepts and principles of cybernetics can be used to model any ontological category of 
     m. C          m d            ‘                  ’,             wh  h   g            h       m      
processes are fedback so as to control those processes. Cybernetic models are explanatory. They aim 
to show how a system is organised. They require interpretation as part of a narrative. Thus a theory 
is a model together with its interpretation.  
I    m      p    , G  d   P  k (1975 , p. 13)        “C               h                    m   p      g 
defensible metaphors; showing how they can be constructed and what can be inferred as a result of 
 h     x       .”  
Our interest here is in modelling living systems, which cybernetics categorises as self-organising and 
autopoietic, self-       g (M          d V     , 1980).  I   k  v   F       ’           d  initions: 
“A   p           h     g   z      wh  h   mp          w    g   z     ”; “A   p            m      
 h  m d   m        p         g                   d.” (v   F       , 2003, p. 281). 
A propos of our interest in conscious systems, those with which the observer may converse, it is 
               P  k’  (1969) d              w                  m    d    g  g         d      m . 
Taciturn systems are distinguished and observed by an external observer who infers or builds in their 
goals. Language oriented systems are self-distinguishing and set their own goals. They are interacted 
w  h (   v    d w  h)      p      p         v  . A p        P  k’  d           w            mm d  p 
by von Foerster in his (1974) distinction between a first order cybernetics (the cybernetics of 
observed systems) and a second order cybernetics (the cybernetics of observing systems, the 
observation of observation). Thus to attempt to model and understand conscious systems is to study 
language oriented systems and to engage in second order cybernetics. 
With second order cybernetics, the observer is explaining herself to herself in a never-ending 
hermeneutic narrative and conversational circularity, a spiral of storytelling, agreements, 
disagreements, understandings and misunderstandings (see figure 1). Here we see the limits of what 
can be modelled, what can be explained, as alluded to in our earlier discussion of metaphysics and 
undecideable questions. As Pask (1969) points out, these limits should not be taken as a reason for 
despair, rather they show the open-ended and creative nature of our attempts to understand 
ourselves and the world we live in. We can hope for deeper and better understandings of what it is to 
be human. 
Von Foerster insists that social cybernetics  is a second   d              : “                   m       
a second-order cybernetics – a cybernetics of cybernetics – in order that the observer who enters the 
     m  h           w d       p      h    w  p  p    … I  w          d    , w   h    p  v d   h  
excuses fo   h    wh  w                 h     p                h     w               m   d      .” 
(von Foerster, 2003, p. 286) 
In contrast to positivist approaches to the social sciences (e.g., network science, complexity studies 
and other approaches in the systems sciences), I agree with a majority of the great sociologists (Max 
W    , Em    D  kh  m   d T       P      ,      x mp  )   h     d            g       “ h        ”    
required in the social sciences. This accords well with our earlier discussion of von Dem    ’ 
metvaphysical categories: passage, extension, idea and intention (von Demarus). 
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In the theorising that follows, I make an analytic distinction between organisationally closed bio-
mechanical systemic unities, which exhibit passage and extension and organisationally closed 
psychosocial systemic unities which exhibit idea and intention. I have taken this distinction from 
Pask who in his cybernetic theory of conversations, refers to the former as Mechanical (M) 
Individuals and the latter as Psychological (P) Individuals. A P Individual (qua psychosocial unity) 
has the organisational form of a conversation and may be embodied in one or more M Individuals. 
5. Sociocybernetic models of conscious systems 
Cybernetic models help us understand how the brain functions as a complex command and control 
     m. C          d         d  R    A h  ’  (1948)w  k    ‘              ’ ( h       ’              d p  
   p            ), K  m  , M C     h      ’  (1969) w  k     h  h       h       g              h  
reticular f  m        d  h       ’             m k  v                       d               wh   
‘m d ’    p    h    d     (  gh ,     ,    ,     p   d      ), M       ’    d      d  g     h           
    p                 d           w  k   d v   F       ’  w  k    how the brain constructs a stable 
‘       ’. 
I          ‘               ’  h    m d     h    dd     h m   p   h   g     p           d h m   
interaction.  
Figure 2 is an attempt to show the complex dynamic processes that occur as a human learns. The 
brain/body system is a bio-mechanical unity (M Individual) that actively seeks and processes variety. 
As it adapts and habituates to the stimuli captured by the sensory systems, it seeks more variety. A 
number of bodily processes guide and affect the systems. In figure 2, these are labelled: kinaesthesia, 
w  h         m   h  p  p     p  v    d v               m ;         p     (      g     h    d ’  
internal state), algedonic (pain, pleasure) feedback: endocrine and immune systems. There is also 
feedback through the environment. Motor responses affect sensory inputs, which inform the learner 
about where she is and what is happening around her. Familiar settings call forth learned responses. 
Unfamiliar settings induce learning and adaptation that reduces uncertainty. The figure shows the 
parts of the system where there is awareness and the learner is conscious with herself of what is 
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happening. As an embodied psychosocial unity (P Individual) the learner may set her own goals and 
direct her own attention. 
 
Figure 2. The dynamics of learning and awareness 
As a graduate researcher, under the supervision of Gordon Pask, I carried out a series of studies of 
how learners acquire keyboard skills. Learners followed different regimes. In control groups, 
       ’       w d   nventional drill and practice methods. In experimental groups, others were 
taught using adaptive teaching machines that presented stimuli indicating which keys to press at 
      wh  h w     d p  d     h         ’  d g              . A  p        h       d  s, in 1975, I 
constructed a computer program model that gave an account how learning takes place. As an aid to 
exposition, the model had several versions of increasing complexity. The most complex model was 
     d  h  “F    T p   ” m d  .  H    I g v      ief description of how the model works. For more 
about the Typist models and the experimental studies on which they were based, see Scott and 
Bansal (2013, 2014) 
The model simulates the acquisition of the skill of touch typing. It explains why proficient touch 
typists (1) lose access to a conscious knowledge of the skill structure and (2) are frequently aware 
that an error has been made, prior to the receipt of feedback. 
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The learner is modelled as a dynamical self-organising system in which achievement of goals is 
   j         “         g ”      m .    m    (k       d  h        )     p       d                
discrete events in which the learner has a limited time in which to respond. Feedback is provided 
about whether or not the response was successful. 
Lear   g      m     d        v           p      :            ‘ p       ’ wh  h d   d  wh  h    g      
move in which direction, are selected from a population of possible responses. If energy is available, 
complex operators, which combine a particular move with a particular finger, may be constructed 
from simple operators. There is an advantage from doing this as applying a complex operator takes 
         g   h    pp    g       mp    p          p       . A ‘m p’     h  k      d              d    
inference rules (logical operators) can be used to reduce the set of possible responses. The 
interaction of operators applied concurrently is simulated by a set of serial executions of the 
operators that exhausts the set of possible interactions. With proficiency, conscious knowledge of 
 h  k      d ‘m p’        . 
P          p     m         h          d     h                   wh    “wh  h    g   w  h wh  h m v ” 
operators are immediately available and applied and where the keyboard map serves only as an 
internal template or description of the desired goal that non-consciously confirms or disconfirms 
what was done. A disconfirmation in the model simulates the situation where the proficient typist 
becomes aware of making an error: his/her daydream is interrupted and he/she is called upon to 
attend consciously to the task at hand. The theoretical justification for the form of the simulation is 
that the cognition of the typist is seen as a unitary organisation in which particular processes go on 
concurrently, autonomously and unconsciously so when they do not conflict. When there is conflict 
there is uncertainty; the learner becomes aware that something requires her attention. The 
uncertainty is reduced when the learner decides how to resolve the conflict. 
6. Conversation Theory 
The Typist model can be generalised for domains other than touch typing as follows. 
In the model, operators are created and evolve that bring about finger movements and key pressing. 
In general, there are cognitive operators or processes that bring about or maintain a relation in a 
(g v  )    v             p        . A        g         m         h p            ‘     p  ’. (      g    
3.) Also in the model there are operators (processes) that create and maintain the processes that 
bring about finger movement and key pressing. In general there are cognitive operators that bring 
         m             p  , ‘     p           p  ’. A        g         m         h p            
‘m m     ’. I   h  F    T p    m d  ,  h   v      p            q     g   d p     m  g  he skill has a 
cyclic form: knowing leads to doing which leads to further knowing and further doing. The process is 
a whole that reproduces itself in the context of the domain of touch typing. 
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Figure 3. A concept is a cognitive process that brings about, recalls, recognises or maintains a relation, R. 
A stable (organisationally closed) system of concepts and memories is what Pask refers to as a P-
Individual (Psychological Individual). (See figure 4.) The terminology is due to Pask as used in 
conversation theory (Pask, Scott and Kallikourdis 1973, Pask 1975). Conversation theory had its 
beginnings in studies of skill-learning; its scope was much enlarged by studies of the learning of 
academic subject matter (Pask and Scott 1972, 1973). Scott (1993) provides an historical account of 
 h  d v   pm          v          h    .       (2009) p  v d       mm          v          h    ’  
key concepts. 
 
Figure 4. A P-Individual 
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The Typist model explains key aspects of human cognition: how consciously constructed knowledge 
becomes proceduralised, how conflict in concurrently executed process may engender the conscious 
awareness of error and uncertainty.  The explanations are necessarily second-order: they explain the 
observer to herself. As constructor of the model and narrator of the theory that gives it significance, I 
am aware, in conversation with myself, that in writing this article I have been engaged in learning 
and the acquisition and performance of skills. Suitably generalised, the theory provides an account of 
     w  g      . O  ’                  v    p     m   d    ’    d      d  g        v    p     p    
serve as constraints to which evolving concepts must fit. The construction of a satisfactory new 
concept may happen within a few milliseconds or may require deep thought and gestation over a 
period of days, weeks or a life time.  
P  k’  g          m      h  d   m        h    g    v  p                       g   d         ucting 
     p    h               v          w  h            w  h   h       ‘     p           ’. 
Conceptualisation is conserved (one cannot not conceptualise). This is the ongoing process of 
thinking, imagining and problem solving. Concepts may be refined as new distinctions are made (for 
example, dogs are distinguished as different breeds. Concepts may be generalised as distinctions are 
voided (for example, dogs are seen as members of the class, animals). Concepts are applied in 
particular contexts of action and interaction (as examples: cycling, doing algebra, playing chess). 
P  k            h       ‘   v           d m    ’. Th  d m               d         g    wh  h m p 
similarities and differences (for example, chess has similarities with draughts and other games). We 
conceptualise selves and others (see figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Conceptualising self and others (original drawing by Gordon Pask) 
I     v         ,  h  p      p          p           h   h     d    h   h  ’  p   p    v       h  
  h   ’ p   p    v       h  d            p      . P      p     ‘p  v k ’ (P  k’     m)    h   h      
answer questions, explain matters and demonstrate procedures. They teach their understandings 
back to each other. They agree and may agree to disagree. In so doing the conversation itself takes 
the form of a P-Individual, a psychosocial unity. 
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7. Creating and maintaining healthy communities 
“  p   h h         d ..  ..       q     v     q        h       d     j g     v             …   d  h  
                             ..” T m Wolfe, The Kingdom of Speech (2016), p.165. 
“W  h     g  w  g     -consciousness and increasing intelligence we must begin to control tradition 
  d     m                   d    w  d   ,    h m                  v       h  g       h        ” A      
Einstein (1949). 
Thus far I have said little about how consciousness arises and how selves are formed in child 
d v   pm        h v  I d       d  h                     g  g  (   ‘   g  g  g’,        M       ’  
preferred term) in these processes. I have dealt with these topics at some length in other papers 
(Scott, 2007a, 2011c) drawing on classical studies by Jean Piaget, Lev Vygotsky, George Herbert Mead, 
John and Elizabeth Newson, Humberto Maturana and others. Rather than revisit these topics in 
detail, I sum up my thinking in figure 6. There I include my concern with how, if we understand the 
processes in question, we may, beginning with socially embedded activities (working, playing, 
learning, teaching and child rearing) and the conversations that arise in them, cultivate communities 
and societies that exhibit the best practices of creative and harmonious living and what I have 















Sociocybernetic understandings of consciousness can give ethical guidance for how to characterise, 
         d         ‘h    h ’   mm           wh  h g  d w    p  v    . Th        m k     p           
characterise pathologies of consciousness, pathological belief systems and pathological communities 
and to find effective ways of healing them. If we make progress in these matters, we may one day 
        h   d         ‘      h m          ’    d       d    H m      M       .  
Emergence of reflective 
practitioners 
and learning communities 
Emergence of individual identity,  
acquisition of knowledge, skills and 
attitudes 
Conversations 
Socially embedded activities 
Figure 6. Learning, as communities, to do things better 
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 “A       h m              ….      -hierarchical society for which all relations of order are 
constitutively transitory and circumstantial to the creation of relations that continuously negate the 
              z         h m        ” (M          d V     , 1980, I    d      , P     15). 
As noted earlier, the business of exploring and understanding the human condition is a creative, 
open-ended process. 
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